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SHRINKING DRUG COSTS  
WITHOUT SILENCING 
PHARMACEUTICAL DETAILERS:  
MARYLAND’S OPTIONS AFTER 
SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH 
KRISTINA L. MILLER* 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court settled a circuit split regarding 
the concern that state laws prohibiting data mining for brand-name prescription 
drug marketing purposes violated the First Amendment right to free speech.1 The 
Court held that Vermont’s version of such a law, the Vermont Prescription 
Confidentiality Law,2 violated the Petitioners’ right to free speech because 
Vermont unjustifiably burdened pharmaceutical marketing, a protected form of 
expression.3  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the Vermont Prescription 
Confidentiality Law, hereinafter the Vermont Act, to determine whether the 
prohibition against prescription drug data mining infringed upon the Petitioners’ 
First Amendment freedom of speech.4 After finding that heightened judicial 
scrutiny applied because the statute involved protected speech and targeted certain 
content and speakers, the Court then analyzed whether the government advanced an 
important public policy goal.5 Although the Court recognized that Vermont’s goals 
to lower health care costs and protect medical record privacy were proper, the 
Court ultimately found that the Vermont Act burdened commercial speech in 
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 1. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2662 (2011). 
 2. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2012), partially invalidated by Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653.  
 3. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671–72. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained, ―[t]he State 
has burdened a form of protected expression that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State has 
left unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views. This the State cannot 
do.‖ Id. at 2672.  
 4. Id. at 2662–63. 
 5. Id. at 2666, 2670. A State may burden protected expression to directly advance a substantial 
government interest as long as the legislature’s means are narrowly tailored and do not suppress 
disfavored messages. Id. at 2667–68.  
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violation of the First Amendment by exclusively restricting a disfavored speaker 
and message.6  
Maryland is among the states that attempted to burden pharmaceutical 
marketing by statute.7 In light of Sorrell, any attempt to revitalize the Maryland 
Prescription Privacy Act would be futile.8 There are alternative measures, however, 
that Maryland can take to reduce state spending on brand-name pharmaceutical 
drugs. Continuing to encourage pharmacies to dispense generic drugs when 
possible, continuing to battle prescription drug abuse, and educating physicians 
about the benefits of generic drugs are viable measures Maryland can employ.9  
I.  THE CASE  
A.  Although a Highly Effective Marketing Technique, Pharmaceutical Detailing 
May Jeopardize Public Health and Medical Privacy 
A physician’s prescribing practices are called ―prescriber-identifying 
information.‖10 This data includes the prescriber’s name, the dosage and quantity of 
a named prescribed drug, and when and where the prescription was filled.11 The 
patient’s age and sex are also included in the prescriber-identifying information, 
although the patient’s name is encrypted.12 Pharmacies receive this information as a 
matter of business routine and federal law when processing prescriptions.13 Many 
pharmacies then sell prescription-identifying information to ―data miners,‖ firms 
that analyze the information and report on prescriber behavior.14 Data miners obtain 
 
 6. Id. at 2670–72. The Court noted, ―[t]he State may not burden the speech of others in order to tilt 
public debate in a preferred direction.‖ Id. at 2671.  
 7. Maryland Prescription Privacy Act, S.B. 266, 423d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) 
(prohibiting the transfer of patient-identifying prescription information unless no payment is received 
and the recipient is one of the listed parties, which does not include parties involved in pharmaceutical 
marketing).  
 8. Id. The Maryland Act is similar to the Vermont Act in that it essentially only burdens 
pharmaceutical marketing speech, and Sorrell v. IMS Health held this measure to be an unconstitutional 
burden on disfavored speech. 131 S. Ct. at 2671.  
 9. See infra Part IV.B.  
 10. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 11. See Marcia M. Boumil et al., Prescription Data Mining, Medical Privacy and the First 
Amendment: The U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell V. IMS Health Inc., 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 447, 450 
(2012).  
 12. Id. Patient names are encrypted; however, patients are each assigned an unique identifier 
allowing data mining companies to link and track patient prescriptions and their prescribing physicians. 
Id.  
 13. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2011); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660; see also Initial Brief: Appellant-
Petitioner at *1, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779). Patients’ names are encrypted, but information 
about doctors and extensive details about prescribing practices are identified. Id.  
 14. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. One such data mining firm, IMS Health, Inc., states on its website 
that it is ―committed to protecting a patient’s right to privacy‖ and uses de-identified patient information. 
Privacy Commitment, IMS, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims/ (follow ―About IMS‖ hyperlink; 
then follow ―Privacy Commitment‖ hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).  
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more information about the prescribers themselves from the American Medical 
Association (AMA), which sells lists of physicians to data miners.15 Combining 
records from pharmacies with prescriber identities from the lists, data miners create 
individual profiles of the prescribers.16 
Data mining is an efficient17 means of analyzing profuse amounts of data to 
detect complex patterns.18 Data mining is used to comb through data in a variety of 
contexts and businesses, such as the tracking of fraudulent transactions by credit 
card companies.19 In the pharmaceutical context, data mining can be used to 
determine and predict physician prescribing practices.20  
IMS Health, Inc. is a data mining firm that collects health care intelligence.21 
IMS Health tracks over eighty percent of global pharmaceutical sales activity and 
processes over thirty-nine billion transactions annually.22 IMS Health provides 
services to ―optimize commercial effectiveness,‖23 and it creates reports that 
incorporate prescriber and patient behavior to reveal commercial opportunities for 
pharmaceutical companies.24 Pharmaceutical companies are interested in prescriber 
behavior and obtain these reports, which are subject to nondisclosure agreements, 
from data mining companies like IMS Health.25  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers use detailers to represent them and promote 
their drugs to doctors by ―detailing.‖26 Detailing is a sophisticated and expensive 
 
 15. See Boumil et al., supra note 11, at 450.  
 16. See id.  
 17. See generally David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients’ 
Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 74–75 (2010). To temper the high costs of detailing, 
pharmaceutical companies increase efficiency by targeting prescribers who favor existing similar drugs, 
adopt new drugs quickly, and are already prescribing drugs from that pharmaceutical company. Id.  
 18. See Hian Chye Koh & Gerald Tan, Data Mining Applications in Healthcare, 19 J. 
HEALTHCARE INFO. MGMT. 64, 65 (2005) (describing data mining in the health care field as ―essential‖ 
in light of recent pressure for health care entities to base decisions off clinical and financial data).  
 19. See Michael Heesters, An Assault on the Business of Pharmaceutical Data Mining, 11 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 789, 793 (2009). The Richmond police department was able to decrease the number of robberies 
at payday check cashing stores after data mining was used to analyze 911 calls, police reports, 
demographics, weather, traffic, and sporting event times. Id. (citing Steve Lohr, Reaping Results: Data-
Mining Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at BU3 (indicating that a twenty percent drop in 
crime in Richmond coincided with the implementation of data mining techniques)).  
 20. Id. at 795 (explaining that predicting prescribing patterns allows pharmaceutical companies to 
dispatch detailers to market to prescribers who write the most prescriptions).  
 21. Overview, IMS, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims/ (follow ―Overview‖ hyperlink) (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
 22. Id.  IMS Health’s revenue in 2006 was $1.96 billion. Heesters, supra note 19, at 792–93.  
 23. Overview, IMS, supra note 21.  
 24. See, e.g., IMS LIFELINK, CASE STUDY: TARGETING HIGH VALUE V. HIGH WRITING 
PRESCRIBERS (2012), available at http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ims/Global/North 
%20America/United%20States/LifeLink/Targeting_High_Value_Prescribers.pdf.  
 25. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659–60 (2011). See also Privacy Commitment, IMS, 
supra note 14 (explaining that IMS uses de-identified patient information and will only use identifying 
patient information with patient consent and for limited purposes).  
 26. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659–60. 
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marketing technique in which detailers, the pharmaceutical marketing 
representatives, schedule visits to a doctor’s office, bring samples and medical 
studies,27 and explain the details and advantages of the drug.28 Detailers are 
effective marketers because they know the background and prescribing history of 
the doctors and are thus able to specifically cater a marketing pitch to each 
individual doctor.29 Although detailing is expensive and time consuming, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers use detailing to promote high-profit brand-name 
drugs protected by patent to earn a profit before the patent expires, which is when 
less expensive bioequivalent generic alternatives can be manufactured.30  
The pharmaceutical industry spends more money on marketing than any other 
business in the United States.31 In 2004, drug manufacturers spent $27 billion on 
marketing and directed over eighty-five percent of marketing efforts at doctors.32 In 
2011, U.S. pharmaceutical companies spent approximately $6.5 billion on detailing 
alone.33 The increase in data miners and detailers34 correlated with an increase in 
spending on brand-name drugs, reflecting the impressive effectiveness of 
detailing.35 The Vermont legislature found that spending on drugs and nondurable 
medical supplies increased from $280 to $524 million between 2000 and 2005 in 
Vermont alone.36 
 
 27. Detailers also often bring food ―to help their sales pitches go down easier.‖ Nathan Thornburgh, 
The States Take on the Drug Pitchmen, TIME, Aug. 12, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1831405,00.html; see also Marcia M. Boumil, 
Pharmaceutical Gift Laws and Commercial Speech Under the First Amendment in the Wake of Sorrell v. 
IMS Health, Inc., 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 133, 137 (2012) (finding that gifts and giveaways 
influence prescribing patterns); Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for the Pizza? Redefining the Relationships 
Between Doctors and Drug Companies, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1193, 1193, 1195 (2003) (describing the need 
to disentangle American medical schools and medical centers from pharmaceutical companies to reach 
the goal of unbiased health care information). 
 28. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.  
 29. Id. at 2659–60.  
 30. Id. at 2660.  
 31. Brief for Michael A. Scodro et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *3, Sorrell, 131 S. 
Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779). The Vermont legislature found that pharmaceutical manufacturers ―spent more 
than any other sector in the United States on its sales force and media advertising.‖ 2007 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 80.  
 32. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. Capturing only one extra prescription per week from each 
prescriber has resulted in a $52 million increase in sales annually. Fact Sheet: Prescription Data 
Mining, PRESCRIPTION PROJECT (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc 
_store/publications/prescription_data_mining.pdf.  
 33. Total US Promotional Spend by Type, 2011, IMS, http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/ims 
/Global/Content/Corporate/Press%20Room/Top-Line%20Market%20Data%20&%20Trends/2011 
%20Top-line%20Market%20Data/Promo_Spend_By_Type.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies also spent $3.9 billion on direct-to-consumer marketing, which includes 
advertisements on television and in magazines. Id.  
 34. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. The Vermont legislature estimated that there was one 
pharmaceutical sales representative for every five office-based physicians. Id.   
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. This increase was the highest increase in spending in any health care category. Id.  
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The Vermont legislature also found that public health is impacted by 
pharmaceutical detailing because patients taking newer drugs on the market may be 
exposed to unknown side effects from a drug that does not provide additional 
benefits over an older, generic drug.37 For example, brand-name drug Vioxx was 
removed from the market due to potentially lethal side-effects related to 
cardiovascular problems that were not initially disclosed.38 The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approved Vioxx in May 1999 after studies required for 
approval did not show any significant risk of heart disease.39 After approval, Merck 
& Co., the pharmaceutical company that created Vioxx, conducted an eighteen-
month study on whether Vioxx could prevent colon polyps.40 This study was longer 
than most studies required by the FDA for drug approval41 and revealed the heart 
problems that led Merck & Co. to voluntarily withdraw Vioxx from the market.42 
Generic drugs, on the other hand, are not plagued by unknown side effects because 
such drugs are only created after a brand-name drug’s patent is expired.43 
―Black box warnings,‖ the withdrawal of a drug from the market voluntarily 
by the pharmaceutical manufacturer or initiated by the FDA due to public health 
concerns over life-threatening adverse drug reactions,44 for new drugs led a team of 
researchers to conclude that new drugs should be avoided when older, similarly 
effective drugs are available.45 Karen E. Lasser, MD, MPH, et al. found that10.2% 
of new chemical entities approved between 1975 and 1999 acquired a black box 
warning or were withdrawn from the market, and 8.2% acquired one or more black 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. See Richard Knox, Merck Pulls Arthritis Drug Vioxx from Market, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 
30, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4054991.  
 40. Id.  
 41. The FDA review process takes around thirteen months for standard drugs and six months for 
priority drugs. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2011 INNOVATED DRUG APPROVALS 6 (2011), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/ucm278358.pdf. The Fast 
Track program expedites approval for critical, groundbreaking drugs by using flexible clinical trial 
requirements, which allows for drugs to be approved based on a single, short-term study. Id. at 7. 
Research and development for brand-name drugs costs $2 billion; the development and approval for 
generic drugs costs $100,000–$500,000 to develop and obtain approval of a generic drug, and generic 
drug manufacturers do not conduct independent research or development of new drugs. Initial Brief: 
Appellee-Respondent PhRMA at *3, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779).  
 42. See Knox, supra note 39, at 3.  
 43. See Isabelle Bibet-Kalinyak, A Critical Analysis of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.: Pandora’s Box 
at Best, 67 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 191, 194–95 (2012) (noting that brand-name drug manufacturers 
compete more against generic drug manufacturers than against other brand-name drug companies and 
that they must aggressively market products while protected by patent).  
 44. See Karen E. Lasser, et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for 
Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2216 (2002).  
 45. Id. at 2219. The authors also noted that patients who must use a new drug should be counseled 
on the drug’s limited safety record and should be observed for possible adverse drug reactions. Id.  
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box warnings after the drug was approved.46 They also noted that serious adverse 
drug reactions are often discovered after a drug has been on the market for a 
number of years.47 These findings led these researchers to recommend that ―any 
new drug should be considered a black box.‖48 
Privacy concerns are also raised by the practice of data mining and detailing, 
specifically that data mining could lead to disclosure of confidential patient 
information or personal prescriber information.49 Prescribers and patients have a 
reasonable expectation that prescription information will remain private and will 
not be disclosed for marketing purposes.50 Prescribers and patients do not expect 
that this information will be traded for purposes other than the filling and 
processing of the prescription.51 
The unauthorized sale and disclosure of medical record information is 
prohibited by state and federal laws.52 Under federal law, providers and covered 
entities are prohibited from selling protected health information without the 
patient’s consent,53 and the penalty for the intentional sale, transfer, or use of 
individually identifiable health information ―for commercial advantage‖ is as much 
as ten years imprisonment and $250,000 in fines.54 States have similar restrictions 
on the disclosure of medical information.55 
 
 46. Id. at 2216. The authors note that ―[i]n Kaplan-Meier analyses, the estimated probability of a 
new drug acquiring black box warnings or being withdrawn from the market over 25 years was 20%.‖ 
Id.  
 47. Id. at 2218.  
 48. Id. at 2220. Vioxx entered the market in 1999 and was withdrawn in 2004. Knox, supra note 39 
at 1. 
 49. See Boumil et al., supra note 11, at 485–86 (noting that privacy is implicated although the 
Sorrell Court did not state that there is a right of privacy in prescriber identifying information).  
 50. See Brief for Michael A. Scodro et al., supra note 31, at *1 (highlighting that states have an 
interest in placing reasonable limits on the unauthorized use of personal information for marketing 
purposes).  
 51. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. The Vermont legislature also found that trade of prescription 
information for marking purposes occurs without consent of the patient or prescriber. Id.   
 52. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). Prescription records are 
considered protected health care information. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). See Brief for Michael A. 
Scodro et al., supra note 31, at *9–*14 (noting that state and federal laws limit dissemination of 
personal, medical, and financial information routinely disclosed in business).  
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 17935(d) (2011) (restricting covered entities from disclosing protected health 
information and only permitting ―minimum necessary‖ disclosures where disclosure is required).  
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2011). 
 55. See Brief for Michael A. Scodro et al., supra note 31, at *9–*14 (discussing numerous state and 
federal laws designed to protect medical record information). See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. 
§ 4-302 (Lexis Nexis 2012) (requiring health care providers to keep patient medical records confidential 
unless disclosure is provided by law).  
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Pharmaceutical data miners argue that patient privacy is not implicated by 
data mining because patients are not identified.56 Pharmacies take prescriber-
identifying information provided to them by prescribing physicians57 and strip 
away the patient’s name, an identifying factor that would compromise patient 
privacy,58 before selling the data to pharmaceutical intelligence firms like IMS 
Health.59 State legislatures argue that privacy can still be compromised, however, 
because patients are assigned a unique identifier which can be linked to prescribing 
physicians, allowing data miners to track individual patients.60 The Vermont 
Medical Society condemned detailing as ―an intrusion into the way physicians 
practice medicine.‖61 
B.  The Vermont Act Attempted to Curb Detailing by Limiting the Accessibility of 
Prescriber-Identifying Information to be Used in Detailing Campaigns  
Vermont enacted the Vermont Act62 in 2007 to prohibit health insurers, 
pharmacies, and similar entities from selling prescriber-identifying information, 
without the prescriber’s consent, to be used for marketing purposes.63 The Vermont 
Act required doctors to decide whether their prescribing information may be sold 
and used for marketing purposes by the pharmaceutical industry.64 In Sorrell v. IMS 
 
 56. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent IMS Health Inc., Verispan, LLC, & Source Healthcare 
Analytics, Inc. at *3, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779) (arguing that 
protecting privacy is not Vermont’s concern because federal and state laws already require that patient-
identifying information be removed by pharmacy companies before transferring prescription 
information); see generally JANE YAKOWITZ & DANIEL BARTH-JONES, TECH. POLICY INST., THE 
ILLUSORY PRIVACY PROBLEM IN SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH (2011), available at 
http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/the%20illusory%20privacy%20problem%20in%20sorrell1.pdf 
(arguing that privacy is not a practical concern because re-identifying de-identified data is difficult).  
 57. This practice is a matter of routine and of federal law. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 
2660 (2011).  
 58. YAKOWITZ & BARTH-JONES, supra note 56, at 3 (explaining that it is insufficient to only 
remove direct identifiers such as names and social security numbers because subjects can easily be 
identified through a combination of indirect identifiers).  
 59. Because of the requirement to de-identify information, IMS Health, Inc. argues the crux of the 
issue is that ―states are hostile to pharmaceutical detailing.‖ Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent IMS 
Health Inc., Verispan, LLC, & Source Healthcare Analytics, Inc., supra note 56, at *3.  
 60. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *7–*8. At trial, a Verispan LLC 
representative testified that its ―linking codes‖ allow the firm to link ―the five P’s,‖ the patient, product, 
prescriber, payer, and pharmacy. Id. at *8.  
 61. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80.  
 62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2012), invalidated by Sorrell V. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653 (2011). 
 63. § 4631(d). ―Marketing‖ includes ―advertising, promotion, or any activity‖ that is ―used to 
influence sales or the market share of a prescription drug.‖ § 4631(b)(5).  
 64. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *1. The Vermont Act directed the Vermont 
Department of Health to establish a program to solicit prescriber consent to prescriber-identifying 
information being used for marketing purposes on licensing applications and renewal forms. VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(c)(1) (2012).  
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Health,65 three data mining firms66 and an association of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers67 that produce brand-name drugs68 challenged Section 4631(d) of the 
Vermont Act as an unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech.69 The 
respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the petitioners, the 
Attorney General, and other Vermont officials.70  
Section 4631(d) of the Vermont Act, the central provision at issue in the case, 
had three aspects.71 First, it prohibited pharmacies and other entities whose access 
to prescriber-identifying information is legal, from selling, licensing, or exchanging 
for value records containing such information.72 This prohibition prevented data 
miners and drug manufacturers, who do not have legal access to prescriber-
identifying information, from purchasing prescriber-identifying information.73 
Second, it explicitly prohibited pharmacies and similar entities from selling 
prescriber-identifiable information to be used for marketing purposes unless the 
prescriber consents.74 Significantly, prescriber consent was only required for 
marketing purposes, while consent was not required for prescriber-identifying 
information used in non-marketing purposes.75 Finally, the statute explicitly 
 
 65. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  
 66. IMS Health, Inc., Verispan LLC (now owned by SDI Health), and Source Healthcare Analytics, 
Inc. are the three data mining firms that challenged the Vermont Act. See Initial Brief: Appellee-
Respondent PhRMA, supra note 41. 
 67. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) challenged the 
Vermont Act.  
 68. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661. The Sorrell case consolidated the lawsuit brought by the three data 
mining firms and the lawsuit brought by PhRMA. Id.  
 69. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent PhRMA, supra note 41, at *7–*10 (arguing the Vermont 
Act furthers an improper goal, exclusively targets pharmaceutical manufacturers, and is overbroad); 
Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent IMS Health Inc., Verispan, LLC, & Source Healthcare Analytics, 
Inc., supra note 56, at *10–*11 (arguing the Vermont government unconstitutionally restricted speech to 
prevent physicians from receiving information which the Vermont government disagreed with).  
 70. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661 (noting that Appellee-Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the Appellant-Petitioners because the Vermont Act § 4631(d) violated their First 
Amendment rights; see also IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 444 (D. Vt. 2009) (stating 
that Plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prior to the initial effective date of the 
Vermont Act), rev’d, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  
 71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2012), invalidated by Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653; see also 
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660 (succinctly explaining the challenged provision of the Vermont Act).  
 72. § 4631(d) (―A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic transmission intermediary, 
a pharmacy, or other similar entity shall not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records 
containing prescriber-identifiable information…‖).   
 73. See Bibet-Kalinyak, supra note 43, at 198 (explaining that preventing all entities with legal 
access to the information from selling the information effectively prevented data miners and drug 
manufacturers from being able to access it).  
 74. § 4631(d) (―A health insurer… shall not sell…, nor permit the use of regulated records 
containing prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the 
prescriber consents.‖); see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660 (explaining this prohibition effectively barred 
pharmacies from disclosing prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes).  
 75. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (highlighting that academic organizations could use prescriber-
identifying information to promote generic drugs but that brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers 
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prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using prescriber-
identifying information for marketing or promotional purposes unless the prescriber 
consents.76 In sum, this section of the statute (1) prohibited entities authorized to 
obtain prescriber-identifiable information from selling, licensing, or exchanging it; 
(2) explicitly prohibited these entities from allowing prescriber-identifying 
information to be used for promotional purposes, unless the prescriber consents; 
and (3) explicitly prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from 
using prescriber-identifiable information for promotional purposes, unless the 
prescriber consents77 
Only Section 4631(d) of the Vermont Act, a two-sentence provision, was 
challenged. Unchallenged aspects of the Vermont Act include that the Vermont 
Attorney General could pursue civil remedies against violators.78 Exceptions to the 
Vermont Act’s prohibitions on sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying 
information included disseminating the information for use in health care research, 
educational communications to educate patients on treatment options, and for 
purposes ―otherwise provided by law.‖79 In addition, the Vermont Act authorized 
funding to educate prescribers ―about commonly used brand-name drugs for which 
the patent has expired‖ or soon will expire and to promote the use of generic drugs, 
also known as ―counter-detailing.‖80  
Following a bench trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont 
upheld the Vermont Act.81 The court applied the Central Hudson Gas & Electricity 
Corp v. Public Service Commission intermediate scrutiny framework82 for 
evaluating commercial speech regulations.83 Concluding that legislative action was 
reasonable and based on substantial evidence, the court upheld the Vermont Act as 
 
could not use such information to promote brand-name drugs). The consent requirement made the 
prescriber ―the guardian of the [prescriber-identifying] information for marketing purposes.‖ Bibet-
Kalinyak, supra note 43, at 198.  
 76. § 4631(d) (―Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use 
prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber 
consents as provided in subsection (c) of this section.‖).  
 77. Id.  
 78. § 4631(f) (authorizing the attorney general to file a civil action for any violations of the 
Vermont Act and to investigate and obtain remedies).  
 79. § 4631(e). 
 80. § 4622(a)(2012); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660–61 (also noting that ―counterdetailers‖ use 
prescriber-identifying information to increase program effectiveness); see also infra Part IV.B.3.  
 81. IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 440 (D. Vt. 2009) (stating that Plaintiffs 
sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prior to the initial effective date of the Vermont Act), 
rev’d, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  
 82. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (promulgating the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech). 
Under Central Hudson, commercial information that is truthful and non-misleading may be limited if 
the restriction: (1) supports a substantial government interest; (2) directly advances the asserted interest; 
and (3) is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 563–66.  
 83. IMS Health, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d at 447–56. The court found the Central Hudson framework 
for intermediate scrutiny applied because the challenged provision of the Vermont Act strictly regulated 
the use of prescriber-identifying information in marketing, ―a decidedly commercial use.‖ Id. at 447.  
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an effective and targeted response to state interests in protecting the public against 
harmful drug practices and reducing prescription drug costs.84 Specifically, the 
court found that the Vermont Act promoted the substantial government interests in 
cost containment and protecting public health in ―a direct and material way‖ that 
was narrowly tailored because it exclusively targeted marketing using prescriber-
identifying information.85  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the 
District Court decision, holding that the Vermont Act violated the First 
Amendment by burdening speech of pharmaceutical marketers and data miners 
without adequate justification.86 The Second Circuit agreed that the Central 
Hudson framework applied; however, it found the Vermont Act failed to meet the 
standard because it did not directly advance state interests in cost containment and 
public health.87 The Second Circuit found the Vermont Act was not narrowly 
tailored to regulate ―new and allegedly insufficiently tested brand-name drugs‖ 
where cheaper generic drugs existed because the statute targeted all brand-name 
prescription drugs, not only those for which generic alternatives existed.88 This 
ruling was at odds with previous similar cases in the First Circuit.89  
Maine and New Hampshire had enacted legislation similar to the Vermont 
Act.90 The First Circuit, however, upheld these similar laws on two separate 
occasions. In IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, the court found that prescriber-identifying 
information was conduct, not speech subject to regulation by the First 
Amendment.91 In IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, the court followed this precedent and 
upheld Maine’s Act to Amend the Prescription Privacy Law,92 a statute making 
 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 450. The court did not consider whether protecting prescriber privacy was a substantial 
government interest because it had already accepted cost containment and protecting public health as 
legitimate ends. Id. The Second Circuit found protecting prescriber privacy was ―too speculative to 
qualify as a substantial state interest under Central Hudson.‖ IMS Health, Inc., 630 F.3d at 276. 
 86. IMS Health, Inc., 630 F.3d at 267.  
 87. Id. at 277. 
 88. Id. at 279.  
 89. IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 1711-E(2-A) (2007), a Maine statute making prescriber-identifying information unavailable for use 
in brand-name prescription drug marketing, and after finding that prescriber-identifying information is 
not a form of speech). This decision echoed the First Circuit’s earlier decision concerning the New 
Hampshire Prescription Information Law, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31847-f, 318:47-g, 318-B:12(IV) 
(2006). IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 90. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E(2-A) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31847-f, 
318:47-g, 318-B:12(IV) (2006).  
 91. 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the law addresses the transferring and 
aggregating prescriber-identifying information for commercial ends which is conduct, not protected 
speech). The court explained, ―[t]he plaintiffs, who are in the business of harvesting, refining, and 
selling this commodity, ask us in essence to rule that because their product is information instead of, say, 
beef jerky, any regulation constitutes a restriction on speech. We think that such an interpretation 
stretches the fabric of the First Amendment beyond any rational measure.‖ Id. at 53. 
 92. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E(2-A) (2007). 
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prescriber-identifying information unavailable for use in brand-name prescription 
drug marketing, after reiterating that prescriber-identifying information is conduct, 
not speech, and therefore not subject to First Amendment protections.93 
The First Circuit and Second Circuit came to different conclusions regarding 
whether prescriber-identifying information and the transfer of such information is 
conduct or speech. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 7, 2011 
to settle this split in the circuits and, if prescriber-identifying information is speech, 
to determine whether the Vermont Act and similar legislation violated the First 
Amendment by improperly burdening protected commercial speech.94  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  For Decades, Vermont Used Legislative Tools to Protect the Health and 
Privacy of Its Citizens and to Combat Rising Prescription Drug Costs 
Vermont is a prescription drug cost-containment leader and aggressively 
fought to lower drug costs and increase pharmaceutical marketing transparency in 
its Medicaid program.95 Since 1894, Vermont has regulated ―every aspect of the 
profession, including licensing, physical space, security, staff, recordkeeping, 
reference materials, and advertising.‖96 Vermont’s regulations supplement federal 
regulations of the industry, including the FDA’s approval of new drugs and the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) concerning privacy 
in the health industry.97  
Vermont’s efforts to regulate the pharmaceutical industry and protect the 
public health of its citizens98 include a law enacted in 1978 which requires 
pharmacists to dispense the generic form of a drug (1) if it was available and (2) 
unless the prescriber requested the brand-name drug.99 Vermont also attempted to 
 
 93. Mills, 616 F.3d at 18–23.  
 94. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2662 (2011).  
 95. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. Vermont aggressively sought to lower drug costs in the state 
Medicaid program by enacting pharmacy best practices, cost control programs, mandatory generic 
substitution, and mail order purchasing. Id.   
 96. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *4. See generally 04-030 VT. CODE R. § 
230 (2009).  
 97. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *3–*6; see also Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (creating privacy measures in the medical field); Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 U.S.C.) (giving the FDA authority to oversee the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics).  
 98. See infra Part I (explaining that brand-name prescription drug use implicates public health 
concerns because new brand-name drugs may have unknown harmful side effects that could lead to 
black box warnings and voluntary withdrawals).  
 99. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *4; see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4605, 
4606 (2012) (requiring pharmacists to dispense the lowest priced bioequivalent generic drug unless the 
prescriber indicates that a brand-name drug is necessary).  
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require pharmaceutical marketers to disclose marketing costs and drug pricing 
information to doctors during marketing visits.100
 
Vermont argued that the Vermont Act was a lawful exercise of its regulatory 
authority and a continuation of state efforts to regulate the medical and 
pharmaceutical fields.101 The Vermont legislature created the Vermont Act in 
response to legislative findings that marketing program goals ―are often in conflict 
with the goals of the state‖ and that pharmaceutical marketing campaigns resulted 
in a ―one-sided‖ marketplace for ideas.102 By eliminating pharmaceutical 
marketers’ access to prescriber-identifying information, Vermont sought to remedy 
doctors’ reliance on biased information, prevent detailers from harassing doctors 
with marketing campaigns, protect prescriber privacy, and reduce state spending on 
brand-name drugs when generic alternatives exist.103 Although Vermont’s 
regulatory efforts may have been legitimate, the Vermont Act was invalidated as a 
violation of the First Amendment commercial speech doctrine.104  
B.  The Extent of the First Amendment’s Commercial Speech Protection Was 
Disputed as it Was Unclear Whether Prescriber-Identifying Information Was 
Speech and Whether Vermont’s Policy Goals Justified Burdens on Speech 
The primary disagreement in Sorrell concerned the proper standard for 
adjudicating the First Amendment’s commercial speech protections.105 Vermont 
asserted that the First Amendment permits government restrictions on access to or 
use of non-public information and also argued that information use is conduct, not 
speech.106 The respondent pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers argued that 
 
 100. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. The American Medical Association established the Prescribing 
Data Restriction program in 2006, which allowed doctors to opt in to prevent pharmaceutical companies 
from accessing their prescription records. See Alexander D. Baxter, IMS Health v. Ayotte: A New 
Direction on Commercial Speech Cases, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 649, 653 (2010). Data mining 
companies could still collect and sell doctors’ prescription history to pharmaceutical companies, but 
pharmaceutical companies were prohibited from giving the data to marketers for three years. Id. This 
program was deemed ineffective by some states because it was voluntary, required doctors to re-register 
every three years, and did not stop the commercial advantages of detailing. Id. at 653–54.  
 101. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *10–*11. 
 102. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. Prescribing physicians’ practices reflect that detailing by 
pharmaceutical representatives increases drug sales more so than advertisements in professional 
journals, and physicians are more likely to prescribe newer expensive drugs despite no medical 
advantage over the generic version. Orentlicher, supra note 17, at 75–76.  
 103. Brief for Michael A. Scodro et al., supra note 31, at 2.  
 104. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011) (holding that Vermont’s justifications 
for the Vermont Act, namely protecting medical privacy, improving public health, and reducing health 
care costs, do not withstand the heightened scrutiny required for First Amendment commercial speech 
protection).   
 105. Id.  
 106. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 13, at *22–*27. Vermont cited the First Circuit 
decisions and a Supreme Court decision, Los Angeles Police Dept’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 
as the applicable precedents. Id. In United Reporting, the Court had held that a plaintiff could not raise a 
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the correct standard was heightened scrutiny as promulgated in Central Hudson 
because communicating aggregated data and marketing to prescribing physician are 
protected forms of speech.107 Sorrell settled the dispute and contributed to First 
Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence by establishing that the use of 
prescriber-identifying information for marketing is speech108 and that the Vermont 
Act’s regulation of prescriber-identifying information amounted to a regulation of 
commercial speech, which warranted a heightened judicial scrutiny analysis.109  
The Supreme Court found in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council that commercial speech is protected by the First 
Amendment, and this basic tenet remains good law.110 The more significant 
inquiries are what constitutes ―commercial speech‖ and how it should be 
safeguarded.111 The main case addressing these two questions is Central Hudson, 
which defined ―commercial speech‖ and articulated a test for when the government 
may regulate it.112  
Central Hudson defined ―commercial speech‖ as ―expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.‖113 This definition attempted 
to remedy the over- and under-inclusive nature of Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy’s definition of ―commercial speech‖ as an expression that ―proposes a 
 
prima facie challenge to a content-based regulation barring access to information held by the 
government. 528 U.S. 32, 48 (1999). 
 107. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent PhRMA, supra note 41, at *12, *18.  
 108. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (reaching the conclusion that using prescriber-identifying 
information for marketing was a form of speech without much pageantry, simply noting that previous 
Supreme Court cases established ―that the creation and dissemination of information are speech within 
the meaning of the First Amendment‖). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (noting 
that ―it is hard to imagine‖ what would constitute speech if disclosing and publishing information are 
―expressive conduct‖ and not speech) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 120 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
 109. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666–67.  
 110. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). Interestingly, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy involved a 
government regulation preventing pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices because the 
government feared pharmacies would go out of business in an effort to keep up with aggressive price 
lowering practices. Id. at 767–69. Regular prescription drug consumers, ―the poor, the sick, and 
particularly the aged,‖ challenged the regulation because they were spending a ―disproportionate‖ 
amount of money on prescription drugs and would benefit from the advertisements. Id. at 763. The 
Court held that a pharmacist’s communication of what he charges for a prescription drug is commercial 
speech protected by the First Amendment because society has ―a strong interest in the free flow of 
commercial information.‖ Id. at 764.  
 111. Id. at 770–73 (clarifying that the Court’s holding only protects ―commercial speech‖ where 
―commercial speech‖ is ―the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful 
activity‖).  
 112. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See also Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433 (1971) 
(analyzing the justifications for omitting commercial speech from First Amendment protection and 
exploring how the judiciary has dealt with the problem of commercial speech).  
 113. 447 U.S. at 561.  
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commercial transaction.‖114 Both definitions have been criticized as being 
ambiguous, and the Supreme Court has yet to focus on what ―commercial speech‖ 
fully entails.115 For now, Central Hudson guides courts to find the speech is 
―commercial speech‖ protected by the First Amendment if it concerns lawful 
activity and is not misleading.116  
Once speech is found to be protected commercial speech, the Central Hudson 
test for determining whether the government may regulate the speech involves 
three additional inquiries.117 First, the government’s restriction must be justified by 
a substantial interest.118 Second, the law must directly advance the government’s 
interest.119 Third, the regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve the 
government’s interest.120 This Central Hudson framework of narrowly tailored 
regulations substantially related to achieving an important government goal was 
relied on by the Court to invalidate governmental restrictions on commercial 
speech in subsequent cases.121 
 
 114. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. The Court examined whether speech which 
merely ―propose[s] a commercial transaction‖ and does not promote ideas, truth, science, morality, or art 
lacks protection, ultimately holding that commercial speech does not lack protection. Id. (citations 
omitted).  
 115. Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 
79–87 (1999) (describing the Court’s various imperfect definitions of ―commercial speech‖ and the 
criticism of the Court’s inconsistency and lack of clarity in this regard).  
 116. 447 U.S. at 566–68 (finding advertising is commercial speech because, even in monopoly 
markets, it increases the amount of information available to consumers for making decisions). The 
Central Hudson Court found the government ban on utility advertising violated the First Amendment 
right to free speech because the State’s asserted substantial interests were not narrowly tailored to the 
advertising restrictions. Id. at 570–71. 
 117. Id. at 566 (―In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, 
we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech 
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we 
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether 
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.‖).  
 118. Id. at 568–69 (finding that the State had substantial interests in energy conservation and 
maintaining fair energy rates).  
 119. Id. at 569 (finding that the State’s interest in energy conservation was directly advanced by the 
advertising ban, but that the State’s interest in fair and efficient energy rates was not sufficiently linked 
to the speech restriction).  
 120. Id. at 566 (finding the complete advertising ban ―more extensive than necessary‖ to further the 
State’s interest in energy conservation).  
 121. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) 
(finding prohibitions on gambling advertisements unconstitutional); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 
535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (invalidating restrictions on advertisements for ―compounded drugs‖ as 
unconstitutional).  
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
The Supreme Court invalidated the Vermont Act as an unconstitutional 
attempt to prohibit a protected form of expression.122 Justice Kennedy, joined by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, and Chief Justice Roberts, applied a 
heightened scrutiny analysis to the Vermont Act upon a finding that content- and 
speaker-based restrictions were enacted by Vermont to burden pharmaceutical 
marketing because the State disagreed with the message pharmaceutical marketing 
conveys.123 The Court found that Vermont’s contentions that the Vermont Act was 
necessary to protect medical privacy and was integral to achieving policy 
objections related to public health care and cost containment could not justify 
burdening the speech under the required heightened scrutiny analysis.124 
Examining the Vermont Act on its face, the Court found that the Act placed 
content- and speaker-based burdens on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-
identifying information, namely that this information could not be sold or given 
away for marketing purposes or used by pharmaceutical detailers for marketing 
purposes.125 Marketing is speech with a particular content, and the Vermont Act 
restricted pharmaceutical marketing by forbidding the sale of prescriber-identifying 
information; therefore, the Vermont Act disfavored a particular type of content.126 
The Vermont Act also explicitly disfavored particular speakers, the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and marketers.127 Detailers were prohibited from using prescriber-
identifying information for marketing, yet a wide range of other speakers, such as 
academic organizations, could use the information to market generic drug 
prescriptions.128  
The Court next examined the purpose and practical effect of the law, 
emphasizing that a prima facie neutral regulation would be unconstitutional if its 
purpose was to suppress commercial speech and if it placed unjustified burdens on 
such expression.129 The Court explained that the record and formal legislative 
 
 122. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).  
 123. Id. at 2663–64 (explaining that heightened scrutiny is warranted when the government places 
content-based burdens on speech because the government seeks to suppress a particular viewpoint).  
 124. Id. at 2667–68 (concluding that the Vermont Act failed to ―directly advance‖ and was not 
narrowly drawn to achieve the government’s interests). 
 125. Id. at 2663 (highlighting that the Vermont Act explicitly singled out pharmaceutical detailers 
from using the information or conveying an effective pharmaceutical marketing message).  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. The Court emphasized the Vermont Act’s flaw in solely prohibiting pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and detailers from acquiring prescriber-identifying information and using the information 
for marketing when other parties could acquire the information and use the information for marketing. 
The Court explained, ―[f]or example, it appears that Vermont could supply academic organizations with 
prescriber-identifying information to use in countering messages of brand-name pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and in promoting the prescription of generic drugs.‖ Id.  
 129. Id. at 2663. The Court cited United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968), for the 
proposition that the effect and purpose of a statute may render it unconstitutional. Id. 
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findings made it clear that the purpose of the Vermont Act was to target speakers 
and their messages for disfavored treatment, even reaching the level of viewpoint 
discrimination in its application.130 Pharmaceutical manufacturers and detailers are 
essentially the only customers seeking prescriber-identifying information from data 
mining vendors like IMS Health, and detailing is in support of brand-name 
drugs.131 The Vermont legislature found that detailers convey messages that ―are 
often in conflict with the goals of the state‖ and designed the Vermont Act to 
restrict these brand-name pharmaceutical marketing messages.132 The Court found 
that detailers and their message were the Vermont Act’s exclusive target.133  
Because the Court found that the Vermont Act imposed specific, content-
based burdens on commercial speech, which is a protected expression, and did so 
because the State disagreed with the message conveyed by it, the Court applied 
heightened judicial scrutiny.134 The Court additionally noted that the free flow of 
commercial speech is of great importance to a consumer, and it can save lives in the 
fields of medicine and public health.135  
The Court disagreed with Vermont’s contention that the Vermont Act was a 
commercial regulation that did not warrant heightened judicial scrutiny, explaining 
that the Vermont Act imposed more than an incidental burden on protected 
expression.136 The Court explained that ―Vermont’s law does not simply have an 
effect on speech, but is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular 
speakers.‖137  
 
 130. Id. at 2663. The Court cited R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992), which invalidated an 
ordinance that prohibited display of a symbol known to arouse alarm in others on the basis of race as 
improper viewpoint discrimination because displays containing ―fighting words‖ that promote racial 
equality were protected while displays advocating the opposite viewpoint were prohibited. Id.  
 131. Id. at 2663. The District Court found as fact that pharmaceutical marketers are the only paying 
customers and that detailing by pharmaceutical manufacturers is by ―almost invariable rule‖ in support 
of brand-name drugs. IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 451 (D. Vt. 2009) (stating that 
Plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prior to the initial effective date of the 
Vermont Act), rev’d, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 132. 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80. 
 133. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–64 (―Given the legislature’s expressed statement of purpose, it is 
apparent that § 4631(d) imposes burdens that are based on the content of speech and that are aimed at a 
particular viewpoint.‖).  
 134. Id. at 2664. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that the 
First Amendment requires heightened judicial scrutiny whenever the government creates ―a regulation 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys‖).  
 135. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665. The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court similarly considered 
the need for the speech’s intended audience to have access to speech, namely that ill consumers who 
regularly take prescription drugs would benefit from pharmacy advertisements telling them the prices of 
prescription drugs. 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976).  
 136. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665. The First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at 
commerce from imposing incidental burdens on speech, however the Act imposes more than incidental 
burdens on speech. Id.; see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 
62 (2006) (holding that a ban on race-based hiring may require employers to remove ―White Applicant 
Only‖ signs).  
 137. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665.  
  
2013] MARYLAND’S OPTIONS AFTER SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH 231 
The Court also disagreed with Vermont’s argument that the Vermont Act 
regulates access to information, not speech, and that such regulation is supported 
by Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.138 The United 
Reporting Court held that a plaintiff could not raise a prima facie challenge to a 
content-based regulation barring access to non-public information held by the 
government, and the Court did not rule on the merits of any First Amendment 
claim.139  
The Sorrell Court characterized United Reporting as ―a case about the 
availability of facial challenges‖ and distinguished the regulation in United 
Reporting from the current Act on two grounds.140 First, the United Reporting 
regulation prohibited access to non-public information in the government’s hands, 
which is distinct from the Vermont Act’s restrictions on the use of information 
already in the private speaker’s hands.141 The Vermont Act involved the 
government prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker 
already possesses, thus it implicated an individual’s right to speak because the 
information possessed was subject to use and dissemination restraints.142 Second, 
the current plaintiffs argued that the Vermont Act burdened their own speech;143 the 
plaintiffs in United Reporting had not suffered a personal First Amendment injury 
and had to invoke the rights of others through a facial challenge.144  
Ultimately, the Court found that the use of prescriber-identifying information 
is speech, not conduct as Vermont contended.145 This holding overruled the First 
Circuit characterization of prescriber-identifying information as a ―mere 
commodity‖ that lacks First Amendment protection.146 The Court reasoned that 
―Vermont’s statute could be compared with a law prohibiting trade magazines from 
 
 138. Id.  
 139. 528 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1999) (finding that a California regulation, which required parties who 
obtained arrestees’ addresses to declare the information would not be used for promotional purposes, 
could not be subjected to a First Amendment prima facie challenge because the regulation did not 
abridge speech rights, did not prohibit speakers from conveying information in the speaker’s possession, 
and did not create penalties for using information in violation of the regulation).  
 140. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665.  
 141. Id. at 2665–66. The Court noted that even though Respondent-data miners do not have the 
information, the information is in the hands of private entities, as opposed to government entities, and 
the ―threat of prosecution… hangs over [Respondents’] heads.‖ Id. at 2666 (citing United Reporting, 
528 U.S. at 41).  
 142. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666.  
 143. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 
F. Supp. 2d 434, 451 (D. Vt. 2009) (No. 1:07 Civ. 00220), 2008 WL 7311222. 
 144. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2666. The regulation in United Reporting required parties interested in the 
information to qualify for the information; the plaintiffs did not even attempt to qualify and invoked a 
facial challenge without suffering an injury. Id.  
 145. Id. at 2666–67. 
 146. Id. at 2667; see also IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (reasoning that 
the Vermont Act regulates ―the ability of data miners to aggregate, compile, and transfer information,‖ 
which is ―a restriction on the conduct, not the speech, of data the miners‖).  
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purchasing or using ink.‖147 Where the lower courts viewed the sale of prescriber-
identifying information as akin to the sale of ―cookbooks, laboratory results, or 
train schedules,‖ the Supreme Court upheld the precedent that the sale of 
prescriber-identifying information was the creation and dissemination of 
information and therefore speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.148  
Vermont’s restrictions on the availability and use of prescriber-identifying 
information imposed content and speaker based restrictions on speech, specifically 
singling out detailers and pharmaceutical marketing as targets of the prohibition.149 
As such, heightened scrutiny was warranted and Vermont had to show that the 
Vermont Act directly advanced a substantial governmental interest and the measure 
was drawn to achieve that interest.150  
The Court generalized Vermont’s justifications for the Vermont Act as 
―necessary to protect medical privacy,‖ including doctor-patient confidentiality, 
and ―integral to the achievement of policy objectives,‖ specifically improved public 
health and reduced health care costs.151 The Court found that neither justification 
withstood heightened scrutiny because both rationales hinged on ―a difference of 
opinion‖ between the detailers and the State, and a state cannot quiet speech or 
burden messengers solely on this basis.152  
The Court contended that Vermont’s stated purpose of protecting physician 
privacy did not justify the Vermont Act because pharmacies could still share 
prescriber-identifying information with anyone and for any reason except to 
detailers or for marketing purposes.153 Had Vermont advanced its legitimate 
interest in protecting patient and doctor confidentiality by allowing prescriber-
identifying information disclosures in narrow and well-justified circumstances, then 
the Vermont Act would be justified.154 As it currently stood, however, the Vermont 
Act explicitly disfavored a specific purpose and speaker, and this burden was not 
justified by the State.155 
Similarly, Vermont’s purpose to advance public policy goals by lowering 
health care costs and promoting public health were legitimate, but the Vermont Act 
 
 147. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667.  
 148. Id. at 2666–67; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (noting that it is ―hard 
to imagine‖ what would constitute speech if disclosing and publishing information are ―expressive 
conduct‖ and not speech) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 120 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
 149. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 150. Id. at 2667–68.  
 151. Id. at 2668. 
 152. Id. at 2671–72 (―That the State finds expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the 
speech or to burden its messengers.‖).  
 153. Id. at 2668.  
 154. Id. (comparing HIPAA, which only allows disclosures in a few instances, with the Vermont 
Act, which allows disclosures for all instances save pharmaceutical detailing).  
 155. Id.  
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improperly advanced these goals in an indirect way.156 The Vermont Act restricted 
prescriber-identifying information from being sent to data miners so that data 
miners could not transfer the information to pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
prevent the pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the information for marking 
purposes, which ―cannot be said to advance the state’s interests . . . in a direct and 
material way.‖157 The Court also found the Vermont Act’s restrictions to be 
especially suspect because the pharmaceutical marketing at issue contains truthful 
information and the audience, prescribing physicians, are ―sophisticated and 
experienced‖ consumers, many of whom found detailing helpful because the 
marketing pitch was directed at the physician’s specific practice.158  
The Court invalidated the Vermont Act as an unconstitutional restriction on 
commercial speech because the use of prescriber-identifying information for 
marketing was speech and the Vermont Act failed the requisite heightened scrutiny 
analysis.159 The dissent, however, disagreed with the application of First 
Amendment heightened scrutiny analysis by reasoning that the Vermont Act’s 
―effect on expression . . . is a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial 
enterprise.‖160  
The dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Kagan, applied the Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.161 standard of giving 
significant weight to legitimate commercial regulatory objectives,162 noting that the 
Court normally gives leniency to legislative judgment for commercial or regulatory 
legislation that indirectly affects commercial speech.163 The dissent also disagreed 
with the application of the heightened scrutiny analysis because precedent dictates 
that ―sales practices‖ that are ―misleading, deceptive, or aggressive‖ lack a 
 
 156. Id. at 2670; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (explaining that the act at issue must advance the government interest in a direct way).  
 157. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (discussing the Second Circuit’s decision).  
 158. Id. at 2671–72. The Court emphasized that ―open channels of communication‖ and making 
information available, as opposed to suppressing information that may be harmful, helps physicians and 
lawyers alike make informed decisions as to what is in their best interest. Id. at 2671.  
 159. Id. at 2672.  
 160. Id. at 2673. 
 161. 521 U.S. 457, 469–77 (1997) (holding that Department of Agriculture regulations requiring 
California tree-fruit growers to finance generic advertising as part of a program for collective action in 
the tree-fruit market did not violate the First Amendment because the marketing orders did not restrain 
the growers’ speech, did not compel the growers to engage in speech, and did not compel the growers to 
endorse political views).  
 162. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673. The Glickman Court performed a searching analysis of the 
regulatory objectives and explained, ―[w]hether the benefits from the advertising justify its cost is a 
question that not only might be answered differently in different markets, but also involves the exercise 
of policy judgments that are better made by producers and administrators than by judges.‖ Glickman, 
521 U.S. at 476.  
 163. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674; Glickman, 521 U.S. at 475–77 (finding that the Central Hudson 
heightened scrutiny test places too high a burden on the marketing regulation at issue and explaining that 
the courts should respect Congress’s power to regulate commerce).  
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heightened level of protection.164 Under this deferential approach, the dissent found 
the Vermont Act a lawful exercise of state regulatory power which advanced the 
legitimate state interests of protecting public health, reducing health care spending, 
and protecting patient and physician privacy.165  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Maryland was among the states that contemplated an act similar to the 
Vermont Act.166 In light of the Sorrell v. IMS Health ruling, this bill should not be 
revived because only futile, toothless revisions would survive judicial review under 
the heightened scrutiny approach to analyzing commercial speech regulations. To 
promote its interests in protecting the general welfare and reducing ―spiraling 
costs‖167 of health care, Maryland can continue, and perhaps strengthen, its current 
measures of encouraging pharmacies to dispense generic drugs and curbing 
prescription drug abuse.168 Maryland should also develop an educational ―counter-
detailing‖ program to teach physicians about the benefits of generic drugs.169  
A.  Maryland Should Not Attempt to Revise or Revive the Prescription Privacy Act  
Maryland should not attempt to revise or revive the Maryland Prescription 
Privacy Act, hereinafter the ―Maryland Act,‖ proposed in 2007,170 because the 
Sorrell Court explicitly held it unconstitutional to statutorily bar pharmaceutical 
marketers from gaining access to patient and prescriber information and using that 
information for brand-name pharmaceutical detailing purposes.171 Any revisions to 
the Maryland Act would be futile because the intended effect of the Maryland Act 
was to stop the unauthorized use of personal information by pharmaceutical 
 
 164. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674–75 (citations omitted). The dissent does not explicitly state that 
pharmaceutical marketing is misleading or aggressive but relies on the ―reasonableness of the 
legislature’s belief in the existence of evils.‖ Id. at 2675.  
 165. Id. at 2681–83.  
 166. See Heesters, supra note 19, at 815 (reporting that Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia also considered bills to 
restrict data mining firms from having access to certain health care information).    
 167. See Brief for Maryland et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398) (addressing the Minimum Coverage Provision of 
the recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and noting that ―spiraling costs‖ are 
among the ―extraordinary problems associated with the current system of healthcare delivery in the 
United States‖). 
 168. See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 169. See infra Part IV.B.3.  
 170. Maryland Prescription Privacy Act, S.B. 266, 423d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) 
(attempting to prohibit the transfer of prescriber or patient information on a prescription).  
 171. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (explaining that courts can consider 
the statute’s language on its face, practical effects, and stated purpose when evaluating its 
constitutionality).  
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marketers,172 and the Supreme Court found that the practical effect of such a law is 
to restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment.173  
Any legislative attempt to prevent only marketers from obtaining prescriber 
information, regardless of whether the statute explicitly prohibits or has the 
practical effect of restricting pharmaceutical marketing speech, would be an 
unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech, preventing Maryland and other 
States from passing such acts.174 The Maryland Act does not contain language 
similar to the Vermont Act’s explicit prohibition of pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and pharmaceutical marketers from using prescriber-identifying information for 
marketing prescription drugs unless the prescriber consents,175 but the usefulness 
and effectiveness of such an act rests on its ability to prevent pharmaceutical 
marketers from using the information for detailing purposes. The Sorrell Court 
noted that pharmaceutical manufacturers are ―essentially the only paying customers 
of the data vendor industry,‖176 therefore the Vermont Act had the effect of 
―preventing detailers—and only detailers—from communicating with 
physicians.‖177 Even without similarly explicit language, the Maryland Act would 
likely be found unconstitutional for having the purpose and practical effect of 
singling out pharmaceutical manufacturer and marketer speech, regardless of 
whether or not the act blatantly excluded data miners and detailers from accessing 
and using the information for marketing purposes.178  
The proposed Maryland Act would prohibit pharmacies and ―data transfer 
intermediaries‖ from transferring prescriber-identifying information unless no 
payment is received and the recipient is the patient, the prescribing or treating 
physician, a government inspector using the information for official business or law 
enforcement, a person authorized by court order, a researcher with written 
authorization signed by the patient, another pharmacy for the limited purpose of 
 
 172. The Maryland Act’s stated purpose is ―prohibiting the transfer by certain persons of 
information that identifies a specific prescriber or patient on a prescription,‖ but, like the Vermont Act, 
it allows all conceivable interested parties access to prescriber-identifying information except data 
miners and detailers. Md. S.B. 266. 
 173. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (finding that Vermont enacted the Vermont Act for the purpose of 
burdening pharmaceutical marketing which that state ―found too persuasive‖).  
 174. Id. at 2663, 2672 (noting that content-based restrictions are sometimes permissible, but not, as 
here, when the government fails to show the law has a neutral justification).  
 175. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2012), invalidated by Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 
(―Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable 
information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents.‖). The 
Maryland Act lacks this explicit prohibition, but it does effectively prevent only data miners and 
detailers from accessing prescriber-identifying information which would almost certainly be used for 
detailing purposes. Md. S.B. 266. 
 176. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (quoting the District Court decision below).  
 177. Id. at 2663.  
 178. Id. at 2663–64 (―Even if the hypothetical measure on its face appeared neutral as to content and 
speaker, its purpose to suppress speech and its unjustified burdens on expression would render it 
unconstitutional.‖).  
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preventing falsified prescription forms, or the patient’s insurer for reimbursement 
purposes.179 Violators of the Maryland Act are punishable by fines of up to $25,000 
and three years of imprisonment.180 The Maryland Act practically, although not 
explicitly, prevents only pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using 
the information because virtually no other party would want or need it. Because the 
practical effect of the law is to target a specific group whose speech the government 
disfavors, the Maryland Act would be found unconstitutional. 
Maryland also cannot revise the Act to create a more narrowly tailored 
approach to protect medical privacy.181 The Sorrell Court noted that the Vermont 
Act may have been upheld if it allowed disclosure in only a few instances, similar 
to the design of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), as opposed to Vermont’s approach of forbidding access to and use of 
information by a specific industry wishing to convey a specific message.182 
Attempts to protect patient privacy would likely be ineffective because (1) the law 
would be a redundant affirmation of current privacy laws at best,183 and (2) current 
data mining practices already encrypt patient identifying information.184 Adjusting 
the statute to protect prescribing-physician is also likely to be impractical because 
the Sorrell Court found that prescriber-identifying information is accessible to a 
number of other parties, including ―insurers, researchers, journalists, and the State 
itself;‖ unless Maryland is willing to significantly limit the availability of 
prescriber-identifying information to all of these parties, then the modified statute 




 179. Md. S.B. 266.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (explaining that the Vermont Act was not drawn to serve the privacy 
interest, as evidenced by the legislative history, language, and practical effect of the Act).  
 182. Id.  
 183. See e.g. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 4-301 (2009) (regulating the confidentiality of 
medical records in Maryland); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 12-403(18) (2009) (promulgating that 
pharmacies can keep records of prescriptions requested to be filled but must keep the patient’s social 
security number, illness, condition, and type of drug confidential). In addition, the Maryland Act did not 
create a significant financial benefit for Maryland. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., FISCAL & POLICY 
NOTE, S. 423-266, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2007RS/fnotes/bil_ 
000 7/sb0277.pdf (noting that fiscally, the effect of the Act would be ―none‖). 
 184. See infra Part I.A (discussing the privacy implications of data mining and detailing).  
 185. But see Jeff Gibellina, Legislating Around the Supreme Court’s Holding that Prescriber-
Identifying Data is Commercial Speech, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 341, 354–55 (2012) (arguing 
that the Vermont Act was narrowly tailored to protect prescriber privacy and that the Court ―grossly 
overstated the accessibility of prescriber-identifying information outside of detailers‖).  
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B.  To Battle Increasing Prescription Drug Costs, Maryland Should Bolster 
Current Measures and Educate Prescribing Physicians About the Benefits of 
Generic Drugs  
1.  Maryland Should Continue to Encourage Generic Drug Use 
Rather than pursuing modifying the Maryland Act, Maryland should focus on 
continuing, and strengthening, the Maryland Pharmacy Act’s encouragement of 
generic drug use.186 The Maryland Pharmacy Act requires pharmacists to inform 
consumers about the availability of a generic drug and the approximate cost 
difference as compared to the brand-name drug.187 Section 12-504(c) of the 
Maryland Pharmacy Act allows a pharmacist to substitute a generic drug for a 
brand-name drug unless the prescribing physician affirmatively indicates that the 
brand-name drug must be prescribed.188 Generic medical devices may also be 
substituted for brand-name devices.189  
Encouraging the use of generic drugs over brand-name prescription drugs 
saves a significant amount of money because the retail price of a generic drug is, on 
average, seventy-five percent less than the retail price of a brand-name drug.190 In a 
study completed by IMS Health for the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, it was 
found that generic substitution saved the U.S. health care system over $1 trillion 
between 1999 and 2010, with $157 billion saved in 2010 alone.191 Maryland should 
continue encouraging the use of generic drugs over brand-name drugs when 
possible because this data proves that using generic drugs saves government 
money.192  
 
 186. Maryland Pharmacy Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 12-101 (2009) (regulating the 
pharmacy-related occupations, prescription drugs, and the acts involved with filling prescriptions).  
 187. § 12-504(b)(1).  
 188. See Pediamed Pharms., Inc., v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 715, 720 (D. Md. 
2006) (noting that a pharmacist may substitute a lower priced generic equivalent for the brand-name 
drug unless the prescribing physician affirmatively indicates that the prescription is to be dispensed as 
written).  
 189. § 12-504(d).  
 190. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE’S PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG SPENDING 8–9 (2010) (noting that this statistic is based on the National Association of Chain 
Drug Stores nationwide average of prescription drug costs in 2007).  
 191. GEN. PHARM. ASS’N, SAVINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GENERIC DRUG USAGE IN THE 
U.S. 1, 3, 5 (2011), available at http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/gpha-ims-study-web-sep20-11.pdf 
(highlighting that ―a greater reliance on the use of generic drugs‖ is one method states can use to reduce 
government overspending in Medicare and Medicaid). See generally Letter from John E. Dicken, Dir., 
Health Care, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, Comm. on 
Fin. (Jan. 31, 2012) (on file with author) (giving a summary of similar studies on savings generated by 
generic drug use and substitution).  
 192. See Duff Wilson, Generic Drug Savings Promoted by Industry Group, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2011), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/generic-drug-savings-promoted-by-industry-
group/ (noting that over $931 billion was saved by consumers and the government over the past decade 
from using generic drugs).  
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Maryland’s efforts to encourage generic drug use are supplemented by federal 
efforts to encourage generic drug use.193 In July 2011, the Affordable Medicines 
Utilizations Act was introduced by Senator Scott Brown of Massachusetts in 
Congress to encourage States to utilize generic drugs in State Medicaid programs 
and for other uses.194 The National Association of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS) 
supports the Affordable Medicines Utilizations Act as a way to reduce health care 
costs and ensure that Medicaid patients have continued access to affordable 
treatment.195  
Another recently proposed federal measure to encourage generic drug use is 
the Generic Drug User Fees program initiated by the FDA in January 2012.196 The 
program amendments proposed would charge application fees to drug 
manufacturers for review of traditional drugs, generic drugs, and new generic bio-
tech drugs in order to address the backlog of generic drug applications awaiting 
FDA approval.197 The Generic Drug User Fees program is designed to generate 
additional revenue that the FDA can use to hire more staff and improve systems to 
support the generic drug review process, with the goal being to improve the 
average review time of generic drugs from thirty months to ten months, the same 
amount of time it takes to review new drugs.198 Combined with these recent federal 
efforts, Maryland’s efforts to encourage generic drug use as a cost containment 
measure may continue to slow increasing health care costs. 
 2.  Maryland Should Continue Programs to Combat Drug Abuse 
Curbing prescription drug abuse is essential to societal wellbeing as well as 
cost control. For example, prescription drug abuse cost the U.S. economy $180.9 
billion in 2002.199 This economic cost translated into $15.8 billion spent on 
substance abuse-related health care spending in the same year.200  
 
 193. See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caraco Pharm. 
Lab., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 601 F.3d 1359 (E. D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-844) (arguing that brand-
name drug patents that contain inaccuracies should be able to be efficiently challenged to prevent delay 
of FDA approval of generic drugs).  
 194. Affordable Medicines Utilization Act of 2011, S. 1356, 112th Cong. (2011). This proposed act 
encourages generic drug use without restricting brand-name drug manufacturer or marketer speech, thus 
it likely does not raise First Amendment implications. Id. 
 195. See John Schultz, NACDS Backs Bill to Spur Generics Use in Medicaid, CHAIN DRUG REV., 
Nov. 21, 2011, at 6 (noting that seventy percent of Medicaid prescriptions are filled by chain 
pharmacies). 
 196. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, §§ 301–08, 
126 Stat. 993, 1008–26 (referred to as the ―Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012‖).  
 197. See Matthew Perrone, FDA Unveils User Fee Program For Generic Drugs, USA TODAY, Jan. 
13, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/healthcare/health/healthcare/story/2012-01-
13/FDA-unveils-user-fee-program-for-generic-drugs/52538458/1. 
 198. Id.  
 199. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PUB. NO. 
207303, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992–2002 vii (2004).  
―Economic cost‖ was divided into three major components: (1) health care, including the use of 
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In Maryland, prescription drug abuse admissions to the Alcohol and Drug 
Abuse Administration-funded treatment programs doubled between the fiscal years 
of 2007 and 2011, reflecting a prescription drug abuse problem that needed 
attention for public health and cost reasons.201 In 2011, the Maryland legislature 
proposed the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, a program designed to help 
medical professionals identify prescription drug abuse by monitoring the 
prescribing and dispensing of commonly abused prescription drugs.202 This 
program seeks to prevent drug abusers from exploiting the prescription system, 
which lacks integration and tracking capabilities, thus allowing drug abusers to 
solicit different physicians and pharmacies in pursuit of prescription drugs.203 
Under the new program, prescription drug dispensers electronically submit data 
whenever a monitored prescription drug is dispensed.204  
The results of similar programs in other states are encouraging.205 For 
example, a similar Wyoming program resulted in reduced costs related to 
prescriptions, addiction, and abuse because prescription monitoring reports reduced 
the availability of prescription drugs to ―doctor shopping‖ patients.206 Also, 
prescription monitoring programs led to reduced costs of law enforcement related 
to drug abuse in Nevada and Maine, and reduced the drug diversion investigation 
time in Kentucky.207 By instituting a prescription monitoring program, Maryland 
will similarly be able to reduce costs related to prescription drug use and abuse.208  
In a similar vein, Corrective Managed Care programs are another way that 
Maryland can battle prescription drug abuse and overuse.209 Part of Maryland’s 
 
resources to address the health consequences of drug abuse, (2) lost productivity due to disability, death, 
and withdrawal from the workforce, and (3) other impacts, notably criminal justice consequences. Id. at 
III-1.  
 200. Id. at IV-1. This data was compiled by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Id.   
 201. MD. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG ABUSE AND DIVERSION: PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM FACTSHEET 1 (2011).  
 202. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, S.B. 883, 428th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011). 
The program was posted in the Maryland Register for public comment. 39 Md. Reg. 801–06 (June 29, 
2012).  
 203. J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR., MD. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER: THE 
GROWING PROBLEM OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE IN MARYLAND 21–22 (2005), available at 
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Reports/PrescriptionDrugAbuse.pdf.  
 204. Md. S.B. 883.  
 205. See ALLIANCE OF STATES WITH PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAMS, 
http://www.pmpalliance.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (compiling information on prescription 
monitoring programs in forty-eight states and one territory).  
 206. See PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAM CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, BRIEFING ON PMP 
EFFECTIVENESS 3 (2011), available at http://pmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/pmp_effectiveness 
_brief_final.pdf. 
 207. Id. at 4.  
 208. See Maryland State Profile, ALLIANCE OF STATES WITH PRESCRIPTION MONITORING 
PROGRAMS, http://www.pmpalliance.org/content/maryland-state-profile (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).  
 209. See MD. MEDICAID PHARM. PROGRAM, MD. DEPT. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
ADVISORY: CORRECTIVE MANAGED CARE PROGRAM AND MISUSE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
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Medicaid program, Corrective Managed Care programs target Medicaid recipients 
determined by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to have abused the 
prescription drug services provided by Medicaid.210 These recipients must obtain 
all services from a single primary medical provider and can only obtain 
prescription drugs from a single designated pharmacy provider.211 The purpose of 
the program is to ensure recipients get the medications they need without overusing 
controlled substances.212  
Curbing prescription drug abuse also reduces other health care costs to the 
State.213 In addition to the cost of the prescription drugs, prescription drug abuse 
costs include doctor’s visits, emergency room treatment, rehabilitation services, 
and other health care costs.214 About one half million hospital emergency visits 
every year are attributed to prescription drug abuse, making prescription drug abuse 
an area that demands continued attention when working to reduce health care costs 
and improve the public welfare.215  
3.  Maryland Should Initiate an Educational Program to Teach Prescribing 
Physicians About the Benefits of Generic Drugs 
Because Maryland cannot silence pharmaceutical detailers due to the Sorrell 
v. IMS Health216 decision, Maryland should join the discussion and launch a 
marketing program of its own. Vermont originally created such a ―counter-
detailing‖217 program in the Vermont Act, granting the Vermont Department of 
Health authority to establish ―an evidence-based prescription drug education 
program for health care professionals designed to provide information and 
education on the therapeutic and cost-effective utilization of prescription drugs to 
 
(2011), available at http://mmcp.dhmh.maryland.gov/pap/docs/Advisory_94.pdf (advising the Medicaid 
community about the new Corrective Managed Care Program); Corrective Managed Care, MD. 
MEDICAID PHARMACY PROGRAM, http://www.emdhealthchoice.org/mpap/correctivecare.htm (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2013) (briefly explaining the program and providing referral forms to keep a recipient 
―locked-in‖ to one particular pharmacy).  
 210. MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.24.14-1 (2012).  
 211. Id.  
 212. Corrective Managed Care,  supra note 209.  
 213. Ctr. for Program Integrity, Drug Diversion in the Medicaid Program: State Strategies for 
Reducing Prescription Drug Diversion in Medicaid, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1 (Jan. 
2012), https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidIntegrityProgram/Downloads/drugdiversion.pdf (noting that ―drug 
diversion,‖ a form of prescription drug abuse involving the use of licit drugs for illicit purposes, is often 
associated with high cost prescription antipsychotic and mental health drugs).  
 214. Id.  
 215. Model Initiatives: Restraining Prescription Drug Costs, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP COUNCIL 
(June 30, 2008), http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci6496.html?kaid=139&subid=275&contentid=253949. This 
statistic refers to nationwide hospital visits and is not Maryland-specific. Id. 
 216. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671–72 (2011).  
 217. ―Counter-detailing‖ is defined as,‖ [a]ny effort by managed care organizations to control drug 
costs by educating prescribing physicians on less expensive equivalent or generic alternatives. J. C. 
SEGAN, CONCISE DICTIONARY OF MODERN MEDICINE (2006).  
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physicians, pharmacists, and other health care professionals authorized to prescribe 
and dispense prescription drugs.‖218 This aspect of the Vermont Act was not 
challenged, and the legislative action creating the program became effective in July 
2011.219 Maryland should follow Vermont’s example and create a counter-detailing 
program of its own. 
Counter-detailing is also known as ―academic detailing‖ because the purpose 
of the marketing program is to educate physicians about the pharmaceutical 
marketplace, not to promote the brand-name drug produced by the manufacturer 
that the detailer works for.220 Academic detailing is designed to counter the biased 
information presented by detailers, and this ―noncommercial education of health 
professionals‖ is typically given by physicians, pharmacists, nurses, or other health 
professionals.221 Currently, the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research 
(AHQR), part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is 
spending $300 billion on an Academic Detailing Initiative.222 Part of AHQR’s 
initiative is signing three-year contracts with organizations to perform counter-
detailing programs while AHQR studies program effectiveness.223 Although this 
comprehensive study is not yet completed, Maryland should join AHQR, Vermont, 
and other states224 in similar efforts to educate physicians because there is a need 
for physicians to learn unbiased information.225  
Maryland needs a counter-detailing program to educate physicians, who lack 
the time to research the pharmaceutical market and consequently may rely on 
information presented by detailers.226 Following the Vermont example, Maryland’s 
 
 218. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4622(a)(1) (2012). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Mike Mitka, New Physician Education Initiatives Seek to Remove the Devil from the 
Detailing, 306 JAMA 1187, 1187 (2011).  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id.  
 224. The District of Columbia, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina all have academic detailing programs. WELLS WILKINSON, 
COMMUNITY CATALYST, INDEPENDENT PRESCRIBER EDUCATION FUNDED THROUGH PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG SETTLEMENTS 3 (2010), available at http://www.prescriptionaccess.org/docs/Funding 
_Prescriber_Education_thru_Settlements.pdf.  
 225. Pennsylvania found that reminding doctors that Nexium often has equally effective generic 
alternatives saved the State $572,000 a year on acid-reflux drug costs. See Thornburgh, supra note 27. 
South Carolina has a similar counter-detailing program called SCORxE, which is a joint program 
between the South Carolina College of Pharmacy and the State Medicaid Program. See Thornburgh, 
supra note 27.   
 226. See 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 8 (finding physicians rely on marketing campaigns presented 
by pharmaceutical manufacturers because they lack the time to research and assess whether these 
campaigns present full and accurate information). Physicians may also be motivated by financial gain. 
Thirty-seven percent of Maryland internists surveyed in a 2004 study by the Journal of General Internal 
Medicine reported that they engaged in pharmaceutical sponsored clinical trials and/or lectures to 
supplement their incomes. See Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’ 
Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491, 498 (2009). 
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counter-detailing educational program should involve collaboration between the 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the University of Maryland Medical 
System to develop a drug education program.227 The focus of the program should 
be to notify prescribers about soon-to-expire and recently expired patents on 
commonly used brand-name drugs.228 The information provided must be supported 
by evidence and independent research of the effectiveness of the drugs.229  
Awards from suits brought by the Attorney General against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers may be used to fund the counter-detailing program.230 Funds arising 
from lawsuits could take two distinct forms: (1) explicitly allocated funds from 
lawsuits alleging illegal promotion charges, such as off-label promotions, as a 
corrective remedy for the illegal conduct on behalf of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, or (2) residual funds from class action settlements.231 For example, 
a 2004 lawsuit against pharmaceutical manufacturer Warner-Lambert regarding 
illegal and fraudulent promotion of the drug Neurontin resulted in a $430 million 
settlement, $38 million of which was allocated to fund an academic detailing 
program to counter the effects of the improper off-label marketing of Neurontin 
conducted by Warner-Lambert.232 Maryland prosecutors could similarly find 
creative ways to structure settlements resulting from lawsuits with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to fund counter-detailing programs.  
Generic drugs save money for the patient and the State without sacrificing 
treatment effectiveness, and counter-detailing programs can educate, and remind, 
physicians about the existence and benefits of generic drugs.233 By spending time 
and money to create and initiate a counter-detailing program, Maryland can help its 
prescribing physicians understand the pharmaceutical marketplace and make 
educated, unbiased prescribing decisions.  
V.  CONCLUSION  
Maryland and other States attempted to combat increasing prescription drug 
costs by using legislation to silence detailers and brand-name pharmaceutical 
marketing.234 Sorrell v. IMS Health, however, found that state statutes burdening 
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such speech violates the commercial speech doctrine of the First Amendment;235 
therefore such statutes are no longer an option. To reduce prescription drug costs 
and protect the public health, Maryland should not attempt to revive or revise its 
version of the Vermont Act because the purpose and practical effect of such an act 
would be unconstitutional.236  
Maryland should fight increasing prescription drug costs by continuing and 
strengthening the current measures of encouraging pharmacies to prescribe generic 
drugs and creating programs to battle prescription drug abuse.237 In addition, 
Maryland should create a prescribing-physician ―counter-detailing‖ educational 
program to teach physicians about the benefits of generic drugs.238 Maryland 
cannot silence the biased messages of pharmaceutical detailers, but Maryland can 
and should join the discussion and teach prescribing physicians about the benefits 
of generic drug use.239 Combined with federal efforts to encourage generic drug 
use, Maryland and other States have an arsenal of tools to battle increasing 
prescription drug costs.  
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